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Abstract: Banks are the backbones of any economy therefore it is of immense importance for 
economies to possess a healthy and buoyant banking system with effective corporate governance 
practices. In Nigeria, the Central Bank replaced the past governance codes with the CBN code (2012). 
Therefore this study examines corporate governance and financial performance in Nigerian banks, 
using this new code. The main issues in this study are: what is the relationship between board size and 
financial performance of banks in Nigeria? What is the effect of the proportion of non- executive 
directors on the financial performance of banks in Nigeria? To what extent is the corporate 
governance disclosure of banks in Nigeria in compliance to CBN governance code (2012)? Does a 
relationship actually exist between banks that disclose on corporate governance and their financial 
performance in Nigeria? These questions were answered by examining the yearly-published reports of 
the listed banks in Nigeria. In examining whether or not there is a relationship between corporate 
governance and the financial performance of the banks, this research employed the regression 
analysis method to determine the relationship. However, the variables that were employed for 
corporate governance are: board size, board composition (the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors), and corporate governance disclosure index. Variables used in this study for examining the 
financial performance of these banks were the financial accountant measure for performance.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Board Size; Agency Theory 
JEL Classification: G21; G30; G34; G38  
 
1. Introduction 
The idea of corporate governance is mostly common to banks and multinational 
firms. Corporate governance has been an item of great importance on the policy 
agenda in most developed countries for many years now. Further to this, the idea of 
corporate governance is steadily gaining huge recognition in the African continent. 
Several recent activities have led to the increased pursuit in effective corporate 
governance policies in all nations. The case of having effective governance policies 
gained universal recognition from a period of absolute ambiguity after series of 
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high profile collapses led to significant interest. The rise in company failures and 
increased fraudulent activities in recent time have led to significant pursuit in terms 
of literature and study of governance principles to determine best codes of practices 
that will improve company performance and going concern. A significant element 
in the pursuit of an effective corporate governance system is the responsibility 
bestowed on the board of directors of the company. The board is in place to 
supervise and monitor the activities of management and also determine the 
strategic position of the company. The board appraises and approves management 
proposals, and they are the first and most significant check for effective 
governance practices in the firm (Brennan, 2006 and Jonsson, 2005). The agency 
theory which has also been employed in this research is widely regarded as the 
genesis for any argument on matters of corporate governance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Various corporate governance structures have been suggested to 
combat and mitigate against this agency problem that seem to exist between the 
agent and the owners. The governance structures suggested by the agency theory 
involve size of the board, composition of the board, CEO pay performance 
sensitivity, directors ‘shareholding and shareholder right. 
Generally, banks are the backbones of any economy; therefore it is of immense 
importance for economies to possess a healthy and buoyant banking system with 
effective corporate governance practices. Poor corporate governance may could 
have a significant impact on any economy, it can lead to bank failures while on the 
long run impact on the public‘s trust on an economy‘s banking system efficiently 
manage its assets and liabilities. A bank‘s assets and liabilities involve its 
customers‘ deposits and if these funds are not efficiently managed could lead to a 
liquidity crisis. It is constantly debated what the right mix of governance structure 
(size of the board, composition of the board and directors shareholdings) is. Das 
and Gosh (2004), argued that how a company performs is dependent on how 
effective these corporate governance structure is and therefore makes this area one 
for further research. Although, this area has been highly researched in the 
developed economies to determine the effect of this governance structures on 
performance, it has rarely been researched in terms of Africa and Nigerian banks 
based on past literatures reviewed. As a result of this lapses that occur ignoring the 
events in the banking industry in Nigeria for past recent years, this study seeks to 
eliminate the gaps and disconnects that exist in corporate governance literatures. 
However, the following are the objectives of this paper, to determine if a 
relationship exists between size of the board and financial performance of banks in 
Nigeria, to determine if the proportion of non- executive directors has an effect on 
the financial performance of banks in Nigeria. Also to determine the corporate 
governance disclosure of banks in Nigeria in compliance to CBN governance code 
(2012), and to appraise if there is a relationship between banks that disclose and 
comply on corporate governance and their financial performance in Nigeria. 
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2. Theoretical Framework for Corporate Governance 
Rashid (2011) argued that there are various theories that can be used to explain 
corporate governance conventions and also the issues that arise as a result of these 
conventions. Various theories have been employed in explaining these governance 
conventions; these theories include the agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory. Sanda, Mikaila and Garba (2005) also identified these three 
theories as the main and most significant theories of corporate governance and they 
are explained further respectively below. 
2.1. Agency Theory 
The agency theory can be tracked way back to Adam Smith (1776) and his 
explanation of main issues that arises as a result of separation of ownership and 
control of a business. He was of the opinion that managers of funds cannot be 
expected to have a very watchful eye like the owners or providers of funds. Also, 
he opined that oversight and extravagant behavior will always persist in the 
management of the activities of a firm (Smith, 1776). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) established this relationship as an agreement involving 
at least two parties. The two parties usually involved are the principal and the 
agent. The principal usually the provider of the fund employs the agent (usually the 
managers) to perform and run the company on their behalf. Included in the 
contractual agreement, the principal will bestow upon the agent decision-making 
authority. However, the agency problem arises because managers are after their 
selfish interests and individuals are generally opportunist. The managers (agent) 
who are put in control of the affairs of the organization may not always consider 
the best interest of the owners and firm and may pursue their self-activities to the 
detriment of the welfare of the principals (Sundaramurthy, 1996). As a result of 
these agency problems, the principal might end up incurring costs known as 
Agency costs. This Agency cost is a value loss to the shareholders and usually 
involves the cost of monitoring the activities of managers so that goal congruence 
can be achieved between shareholders and managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggested that agency costs include the cost of monitoring, bonding costs, and 
residual loss. The effect of this agency theory is that one can only try to mitigate 
against this agency problem when the board is composed largely by non-executive 
directors (independent and dependent) who will be able to control the activities of 
managers and thereby maximize shareholders‘ wealth (Rashid, 2011; Kaymark & 
Bektas, 2008 and Luan & Tang, 2007). The theory also suggests that the role of the 
chairman and the role of the CEO should not be occupied by the same person as 
this can limit the monitory role bestowed on the board of directors and can also 
have a negative impact on the performance of the firm. It was suggested that the 
reason for limit in the monitory role by the board will be loss of board 
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independence as a result of CEO duality (Elsayed, 2007 and Kang &Zardkoohi, 
2005). This theory is based on the belief that there is a basic conflict of interest 
between the owners and managers of the company (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
Stewardship theory is a contrast or a direct opposite to the agency theory and this 
theory adopts a more idealistic view of humans. This theory is based on a model 
and believes of the agent not being a self-opportunist but a steward that perceives 
greater utility in the interest of the principal and the organization as a whole. The 
theory assumes that a significant correlation exist between the firm‘s success and 
the manager‘s satisfaction. This trade-off is achieved by the steward admitting that 
working towards achieving company‘s and collective goals will lead to self-
actualization. The theory argues for the post of Chief Executive Officer and 
Chairman to be held by the same person. Therefore, control lowers the motivation 
of steward and weakens motivational attitude (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship 
theory poses that stewards are likely to ignore selfish interests in order to pursue 
the best interest of the firm. Donaldson and Davis (1991) observed that when a 
steward has been in a company for so long, the steward and the firm becomes one 
entity. Instead of using the firm for their own selfish interest, the stewards seems to 
be more in ensuring the continuous existence and  long term success of the firm 
because they now see the firm as an extension of themselves.  
2.2. Linkage between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Exceptionally sound corporate governance practice is meant to improve corporate 
performance by blocking the control of the company by the significant 
shareholders and encouraging improved decision making in the process. In return 
to improved governance practices, the value of the firm may react immediately to 
informationshowingimproved corporate governance practices. It should be noted 
thatmaterial reportbacking the link or association between the disclosure and 
compliance to corporate governance and firm performance is scarce (Imam, 2006). 
This implies there should be no existence or possibility for managers or significant 
shareholders to expropriate the resources of the firm. This should in return to better 
management of resources and improve performance. Also providers of funds will 
be easily attracted and would also want to invest in companies with good 
management of resources, good performance with effective governance practices, 
itmight likely lead to lower costs of capital, which can further improve the 
performance of the company. Also, good governance practices tend to attract 
potential stakeholders like employees because they will also want to be linked and 
work with such companies, as they see such company to be healthy, profitable and 
has a going concern than firms with no or less governance.  
It should also be noted that there are some advantages for the economy as a whole 
with good governance practices. This will lead to a financial stable and sustainable 
economy because of necessary actions in place to mitigate against systematic risk. 
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Also, good corporate governance tends to be the starting point for a fair and just 
society. A company with poor corporate governance tends to be the building blocks 
for fraudulent activities and in the long run leading to corporate failures. A limit on 
the exploitation of the less significant shareholders and less fraudulent activities 
between the large organisations and political power can lead to a suitable condition 
for these so called little and more equitable income distribution (Iskander and 
Chamlou, 2000). According to a research conducted by McKinsey and Company 
(2002) cited in Adams and Mehran (2003), the study showed that most investors in 
Malaysia showed the desire to pay more for the shares of a good governance 
company.  The research also showed that the investors were ready to pay a mean 
premium within the limit of 20% to 25%.  
 
3. Model Specification 
This paper made use of the econometric model of Miyajima et al (2003) as 
employed by Coleman and Nicholas- Biekpe (2006) to determine the relationship 
between performance and governance practices. The model is therefore stated 
below as; 
Yit = o + 1Git + 2Cit + et 
Based on this research, the above model has been adjusted to examine the 
relationship that exists between performance of banks and corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. Two simple models have been developed for performance 
variables and the corporate governance variables. Below are the models; 
Model 1 
ROEit = o + 1BSZEt + 2BCOMPt + 3CGDIt + 4FSZEt+ 5DBTt +et    (1) 
Model 2 
ROAit = o + 1BSZEt + 2BCOMPt + 3CGDIt + 4FSZEt+ 5DBTt +et.. (2) 
 
Where:  
ROE and ROA represents firm performance variables which are: Return on assets 
and Return on equity for banking firms at time t. 
BSZE stands for Size of the Board; Composition of the Board is proxied by 
BCOMP which is explained as the proportion of non-executive directors to total 
size of the board, while CGDI represents Corporate Governance Disclosure Index. 
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FSZE represents firm size and for the purpose of this study, log of assets was used 
because the values are widely spread; DBT represents gearing (debt). These two 
variables are the control variables. 
et, the error term which account for other possible factors that could influence  
ROEit and ROAit that are not captured in the model.  
 
4. Data Analysis and Results 
A descriptive analysis was used to give a summary result of the variables. This was 
followed with a correlation analysis to measure the degree of association between 
different variables under consideration. Lastly, the regression analysis was used to 
determine the impact of the corporate governance variables on performance. 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 60 -1.1 0.37 0.028 0.224 
ROE 60 -2.0 1.6 0.015 0.456 
BSZE 60 7.0 20.00 14.53 2.52 
BCOMP 60 0.50 0.92 0.615 0.07 
CGDI 60 0.72 1.0 0.88 0.078 
FSZE 60 8.15 9.43 8.89 0.31 
DBT 60 0.00 0.97 0.35 0.21 
Source: Authors’ Computation, (2013) 
From Table 1 it can be seen that the 15 listed banks included in this research 
generates Return on Equity (ROE) of about 1.5% and there is a standard deviation 
of 45.6%. This means that the value of the ROE can deviate from mean to both 
sides by 45.6%. The maximum and minimum values of ROE are 160% and -200% 
respectively. However, a Return on Asset (ROA) of 2.8% was generated on the 
average, with a minimum and maximum percentage of -110% and 37% 
respectively. Also with regards to ROE and ROA, it can be seen that there is a wide 
deviation between banks. Also for the banks studied, the average board size is 
about 15 and a deviation of 2.52 which signifies that banks in Nigeria have a 
relatively similar board size. The maximum and minimum board sizes are 20 and 7 
respectively. In addition, the average proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board is about 62% with a deviation of 7%. The average CGDI is 0.88 and this can 
deviate to both sides by 7.8%. The bank with the highest level of disclosure has 
100% and that with the least has 72%. Also it can be seen that in terms of firm size 
which is shown by the value of asset base for the banks, they are of relatively 
similar sizes with a maximum and minimum 9.43 and 8.15 respectively and most 
of the banks are less dependent on debt in their capital structure with a mean of 
0.35. 
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Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis measures the degree of association between the 
governance variables and performance variables i.e. whether or not the governance 
variables will improve performance. Figure 4.4 and 4.5 presents the correlation 
results for all the variables reviewed in this study. 
Table 2. Correlation Result for Model 1 (ROA) 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary     
Date: 09/09/13   Time: 15:51     
Sample: 1 60      
Included observations: 60     
       
       
Correlation      
Probability ROA  BSZE  BCOMP  CGDI  FSZE  DBT  
ROA  1.000000      
 -----       
BSZE  0.152335 1.000000     
 0.2453 -----      
BCOMP  0.147201 -0.147753 1.000000    
 0.2617 0.2599 -----     
CGDI  0.285055 0.110295 0.232649 1.000000   
 0.0273 0.4015 0.0736 -----    
FSZE  0.170919 0.453236 -0.307185 0.162736 1.000000  
 0.1916 0.0003 0.0170 0.2141 -----   
DBT  0.147843 -0.213096 0.319456 0.283542 -0.203510 
1.000
000 
 0.2596 0.1021 0.0128 0.0281 0.1189 -----  
       
       
Source: Authors’ Computation, (2013) 
From the correlation result in table 2 above for ROA, the board size has a positive 
weak correlation with ROA with a correlation coefficient of 0.15. This means the 
ROA improves as the board size increases but this increase is not much and it is 
also not significant with a p-value of 0.24. 
Also, the board composition has a weak positive correlation with ROA. Therefore 
as the proportion of non-executive directors to executive directors increases, ROA 
improves but this variable is not significant with a p-value of 0.26. 
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The corporate governance disclosure index is positively correlated at 0.285 and it is 
also significant at 5%. This might indicate that banks that disclose more 
governance issues seem to perform better. 
The two control variables firm size and gearing also seem to be positively weakly 
correlated to ROA and these two variables are also not significant at 5%. This can 
mean the size of a bank measured by its asset base tends to improve performance 
and gearing also tends to improve performance. 
Table 3. Correlation Result for Model 2 (ROE) 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation, (2013) 
From the correlation result in table 2 above for ROE, the board size has a positive 
weak correlation with ROE with a correlation coefficient of 0.187. This means the 
ROE improves as the board size increases but this increase is not much and it is 
also not significant with a p-value of 0.15. 
Also, the board composition has a very weak positive correlation with ROE. 
Therefore as the proportion of non-executive directors to executive directors 
increases, ROE improves with a correlation coefficient of 0.06 but this variable is 
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not significant with a p-value of 0.64.The corporate governance disclosure index is 
very weakly positively correlated at 0.11 and it is also not significant at 5% with a 
p-value of 0.38. This might indicate that banks that disclose more governance 
issues might just seem to perform a little better than others but this value is not 
significant. The firm size measured by its asset base seems to be weakly positively 
correlated to ROE and also significant at 5% with a p-value of 0.03. This might 
mean the size of bank tends to improve ROE. The gearing measured by debt to 
equity is negatively correlated to ROE with a correlation coefficient of -0.11. This 
means as value of debt to equity increases, it has a negative effect on performance 
(ROE). This variable is not significant at 5% with a p-value of 0.39. 
Regression Result 
In this section, the panel data regression analysis is used to investigate the impact 
of corporate governance on banks‘ financial performance using return on equity 
and return on asset. Table 4 and 5 presents the regression results for all the 
variables reviewed in this study. 
Table 4. Regression Result for Model 1 (ROA)  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/09/13   Time: 15:49   
Sample: 1 60    
Included observations: 60   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -1.866851 0.985331 -1.894643 0.0635 
BSZE 0.009170 0.012828 0.714809 0.4778 
BCOMP 0.423273 0.453872 0.932582 0.3552 
CGDI 0.534164 0.400604 1.333395 0.1880 
FSZE 0.111240 0.108438 1.025843 0.3095 
DBT 0.110819 0.148104 0.748251 0.4576 
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R-squared 0.131027    Mean dependent var 0.028255 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050567    S.D. dependent var 0.224061 
S.E. of regression 0.218322    Akaike info criterion -0.111049 
Sum squared resid 2.573891    Schwarz criterion 0.098386 
Log likelihood 9.331462    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.029127 
F-statistic 1.628469    Durbin-Watson stat 1.497498 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.168199    
Source: Authors’ Computation, (2013) 
The regression result is shown in table 4. The regression equation employed ROA 
as its dependent variable and board size, board composition, corporate governance, 
firm size and debt as independent variables. Firm size and debt are control 
variables.  
The result shows that all these independent variables are not significant in 
explaining effect on bank‘s profitability in terms of ROA, even though there is a 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables; it 
seems not to be significant because of the p-value which confirms the relationship 
between the variables could be as a result of random events.  The r-squared 
clarifies this further by indicating that about 13% of the variation in ROA is 
accounted for by these independent variables. 
Board size has a positive effect on bank‘s profitability, one unit increase in board 
size will increase the ROA by the coefficient and vice versa, reaffirming the fact 
that the larger the board size, the better the performance. 
Board composition also improve profitability, one unit increase in the ratio of non-
executive directors to total directors will increase the ROA by the coefficient. 
Thereby, increase in the number of non-executive directors sitting on the board, the 
better the financial performance in terms of ROA. 
The corporate governance disclosure index follows the same trend in terms of 
affecting profitability as board size and board composition. This thereby indicates 
that a bank that tends to disclose more on governance issues is more likely to 
perform better than a bank that discloses less. 
The firm size and leverage both have a positive relationship with ROA. For the 
firm size, increase in bank‘s asset base should lead to improved profitability and 
this should be the case if the banks make maximum use of its assets. For leverage, 
increase in debt in its capital structure should lead to improved profitability, which 
could mean banks with more debt tend to perform better.  
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Table 5. Regression Result for Model 2 (ROE)  
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/09/13   Time: 16:13   
Sample: 1 60    
Included observations: 60   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -4.421382 2.026675 -2.181594 0.0335 
BSZE 0.011488 0.026385 0.435405 0.6650 
BCOMP 1.130007 0.933545 1.210447 0.2314 
CGDI 0.335306 0.823981 0.406934 0.6857 
FSZE 0.378309 0.223040 1.696150 0.0956 
DBT -0.249095 0.304627 -0.817706 0.4171 
     
     R-squared 0.112451    Mean dependent var 0.015063 
Adjusted R-squared 0.030271    S.D. dependent var 0.456010 
S.E. of regression 0.449055    Akaike info criterion 1.331299 
Sum squared resid 10.88914    Schwarz criterion 1.540733 
Log likelihood -33.93896    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.413220 
F-statistic 1.368348    Durbin-Watson stat 1.776561 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.250714    
     
     Source: Authors’ Computation, (2013) 
The regression result is shown in table 4. The regression equation employed ROE 
as its dependent variable and board size, board composition, corporate governance, 
firm size and debt as independent variables. Firm size and debt are control 
variables.  
The result also shows the same result as that of ROA, that all the independent 
variables are not significant in affecting bank‘s profitability in terms of ROE, even 
though there exist a relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables, it seems not to be significant because of the p-value which 
confirms the relationship between the variables could be as a result of random 
events.  The r-squared clarifies this further by indicating that about 11% of the 
variation in ROE is accounted for by these independent variables. 
Board size has a positive effect on bank‘s profitability; one unit increase in board 
size will increase the ROE by the coefficient and vice versa. This follows the same 
pattern as ROA. 
Board composition also improve profitability, one unit increase in the ratio of non-
executive directors to total directors will increase the ROE by the coefficient. 
Board composition seems to have the most influence on ROE amongst all the 
variables. This result is consistent with that observed above in ROA.  
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The corporate governance disclosure index follows the same trend in terms of 
affecting profitability (ROE) as that of ROA above. A bank that tends to disclose 
more on governance issues is more likely to perform better than a bank that 
discloses less. 
The firm size has a positive relationship with ROE. An increase in bank‘s asset 
base should lead to improved profitability. This result is consistent in the two 
models with firm size having a positive relationship on profitability (ROA and 
ROE).  
The Gearing (leverage) has a negative relationship with ROE; increase in debt in a 
bank‘s capital structure would lead to reduced profitability which could mean 
banks with no or less debt tend to perform better in terms of ROE.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The first objective of the study was to examine the relationship between board size 
and financial performance of banks in Nigeria.  The study found board size both in 
terms of ROA and ROE has a positive relationship with the variables. This result 
tend to be consistent with Coleman and Biekpe (2006), they observed a positive 
relationship exist between firm performance and board size. This also contradicts 
Manas and Saravanan (2006), they conducted a research on listed banks in India 
and discovered that there is no presence of a relationship between the size of the 
board and the performance of the banks. This could imply that the large board size 
leads to better decision-making as result of the availability of wide range of 
expertise. 
The second objective of the study was to examine the effect of the proportion of 
non- executive directors (board composition) on the financial performance of banks 
in Nigeria. The study found board composition in terms ROA and ROE follows the 
same trend as board size with a positive relationship.  
This is consistent with Sang-Woo and Lum (2004), reported that there is the 
existence of a positive relationship between having a significant proportion of non-
executive directors on the board and return on investment. This also contradicts 
Sanda, Mukaila and Garba (2005), examined companies quoted on the Nigerian 
stock exchange to examine this relationship and came to conclusion that there is no 
relationship between the variables. This could imply that the non-executive 
directors perform its advisory and monitoring function, thereby reducing or 
eliminating the agency conflicts. 
The third objective of the study was to determine the corporate governance 
disclosure of banks in Nigeria in compliance to CBN governance code (2012). The 
study found a high level of compliance to CBN corporate governance code (2012) 
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by all the banks reviewed over the period and this could be the reason of improved 
disclosure and transparency in Nigerian banking industry. 
The fourth objective of the study was to determine if there is any significant 
relationship between the level of corporate governance disclosure and the financial 
performance of banks in Nigeria. The study found that corporate governance 
disclosure has a positive relationship with the two performance proxies. This 
implies that a bank that tends to disclose more on governance issues in line with 
the CBN code (2012) is more likely to perform better than a bank that discloses 
less. 
Other findings from descriptive analysis show that the average board size is about 
15 among the listed banks in Nigeria. This is consistent with the suggestions of 
Coleman and Biekpe(2006) that a board size of 12 to 16 is appropriate. Also, it was 
noticed that the average proportion of non-executive directors on the board (board 
composition) among the listed banks in Nigeria is about 62%, which is in line with 
the CBN code (2012) where it was stated, ―the number of executive directors shall 
not exceed 40% of the entire board size‖. Lastly, although a mean disclosure of 
0.88 was achieved in terms of corporate governance disclosure, the banks disclosed 
fully on items 2-7, 10-12, 14-17, 20, 23, 25, 27 and 31-32 (see appendix 2 for 
governance code). 
Also the regression analysis of the study shows that the independent variables 
employed only account for about 11-13% of the variations in the dependent 
variables; therefore more other appropriate variables should be considered for 
future studies. 
Lastly, future studies could examine other sectors since this study covers the 
banking sector. It would be of great benefits to have a picture of corporate 
governance roles in other sectors or organizations. 
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